Introduction
The strong association between health and socio-economic status is a very robust finding and is discussed by a large body of literature (see David and Lleras-Muney (2012) or Grossman (2006) for overviews). While there is little robust evidence that income affects health in developed countries 1 , there is strong evidence that a substantial share of income inequality can be explained by health (Deaton (2003) ). Health status is found to be one of the main determinants of labor market participation and early retirement. Both unemployment and early retirement reduce an individual's expected life cycle income with potentially long-lasting impacts on wealth accumulation. As pointed out by Deaton (2003) , this is due to the fact that individuals cannot fully insure their earnings against health risks. Since health shocks affect the dynamics of employment, early retirement, and wealth accumulation, a structural econometric analysis of health and economic outcomes should take into account the relevant processes and individuals' expectations about the consequences of their decisions. There are several recent studies that analyze wage and employment risks within a life cycle framework (e.g. Low (2005) , Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) , Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) , Adda, Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2013) ). This study adds to the literature on life cycle risks by proposing a dynamic life cycle model of health risks, employment, early retirement, and wealth accumulation in order to analyze the healthrelated risks of consumption and old age poverty. In particular, the model includes a health process, the interaction between health and employment risks, and an explicit modeling of the German public insurance schemes, where unemployment insurance and early retirement constitute a partial insurance against work incapacity. Moreover, a policy simulation relates to an idea of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) and investigates means-tested minimum pension benefits as an insurance against old age poverty.
Following a tradition of structural dynamic retirement models (e.g. Rust and Phelan (1997) ; French (2005) ; van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) ; French and Jones (2011); and Haan and Prowse (2011) ), I rely on a dynamic programming discrete choice (DPDC) framework. The model is estimated using data from the German Socio-1 Adda, Banks, and von Gaudecker (2009) find no effect of permanent income shocks on a wide range of health measures.
Economic Panel (SOEP) by applying an extension of the Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm to obtain good starting values for a subsequent full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation. The analysis focuses on single males and, thus, allows abstracting from adjustments of a partner's labor supply and retirement behavior while the analyzed mechanisms are also relevant for couples and single females. I quantify the health-related life cycle risks by simulating scenarios where health shocks do or do not occur at different points in the life cycle for individuals with differing endowments. A comparison of simulated consumption paths between the scenarios sheds light on the health-related risks of consumption and old age poverty that are uninsured by the German social security system. The results of this analysis motivate the simulation of minimum pension benefits that protect individuals from the risk of old age poverty. While such a reform raises a concern about an increase in abuse of the early retirement option, the simulations indicate that a means test mitigates the moral hazard problem substantially. This finding may also apply to other countries with similar institutions.
DPDC models provide a good framework for the estimation of structural life cycle models. Under the assumption of revealed preferences, micro data can be used to estimate parameters that characterize the preferences and beliefs of forward looking individuals. Starting with the paper of Wolpin (1984) , a literature on structural life cycle models has evolved that estimates increasingly complex models (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) for an overview). A big advantage of structural models lies in the possibility to perform ex-ante counterfactual simulations. However, estimating these kinds of models requires solving a dynamic programming problem that is nested in the estimation criterion. If the state space is large and if unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for, computation can be burdensome. This paper resorts to an extension of the EM algorithm to obtain good starting values for a subsequent FIML estimation.
The extended EM algorithm has been proposed by Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) for the estimation of finite mixture models with time-constant unobserved heterogeneity.
The algorithm allows for a sequential estimation of the parameters (see Arcidiacono (2004 Arcidiacono ( ,2007 for other applications).
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes the healthrelated risks of consumption and old age poverty by estimating a structural life cycle 2 model. However, previous studies use structural models to investigate the link between health and the economic situation of households. Bound, Schoenbaum, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann (1999) and Disney, Emmerson, and Wakefield (2006) show that older workers who are in good health status are more likely to be employed, French (2005) finds that health affects labor force participation rates more than hours worked, and Blau and Gilleskie (2008) estimate that bad health halves the employment probability of older employees who have health insurance in the US. Some studies estimate effects on wealth accumulation using a life cycle model. While de Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) show that health costs explain a large share of saving behavior in the US, French and Jones (2011) investigate the effect of life expectancy on optimal saving behavior of retirees and Haan and Prowse (2011) use a life cycle model to estimate the effects of an exogenous increase in life expectancy on employment, retirement behavior and savings in Germany. Low and Pistaferri (2011) analyze the insurance value of disability benefits and incentive costs within a life cycle framework.
Average pension benefits of early retirees who enter early retirement due to bad health have declined nominally from e 706 to e 600 between 2000 and 2010 in Germany, and each year about 160,000 of these early retirees are registered newly with the German statutory pension insurance scheme (Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2011) ).
Since pension benefits are the only income source of about one in two of these early retirees (Albrecht, Loos, and Schiffhorst (2007) ) and individuals who are in bad health status usually cannot compensate for reductions in the level of pension benefits by delaying retirement, there is a concern of health-related poverty. My simulations suggest that both the risk of old age poverty and health-related changes in this risk depend substantially on an individual's endowments and that the health-related changes may be sizable. The simulated health-related losses in the net present value (NPV) of expected lifetime consumption at age 40 that are uninsured by the German social security system range between 3% and 7%. Expected losses can be severe if a health shock occurs at an early stage of the life cycle. The simulations of the introduction of minimum pension benefits at the poverty line indicate only a small decrease in individuals' expected retirement age if the minimum benefits are means-tested (between 0 and 0.4 years depending on endowments). For a non-means-tested scheme, the simulations suggest a severe moral hazard problem.
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The paper is structured as follows. I begin with a description of the data and institutional framework. Then, I proceed with an outline of the life-cycle model and estimation approach before discussing the parameter estimates and model fit. The following section presents the policy analysis on the health-related consumption and poverty risks and the counterfactual reform. A final section sums up the main findings of the analysis.
Data and descriptive statistics
My analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which collects annual information at both the household and individual levels (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007) ). I construct an unbalanced panel covering the years 2004 through
2010.
2 The sample is restricted to single males aged 40 to 64 years with no children in the household. Self-employed, civil servants, and people in institutions are also excluded from the sample. I consider the age cohorts 40 to 64 because early retirement is rarely observed in younger cohorts. As a consequence, the simulations are performed for given endowments at age 40. The focus on single males allows abstracting from adjustments of a partner's labor supply and retirement behavior while the analyzed mechanisms are also relevant for couples and single females. The final sample consists of 594 independent and, in total, of 2,016 observations. Early retirees are only contained in the sample in the first year of retirement because retirement is modeled as an absorbing state and estimation of the model does not require data on individuals after retirement.
There are 57 individuals who opt for early retirement during the observation period.
The consumer price index is used to adjust nominal variables to 2005 prices. Table   1 presents some descriptive statistics on the variables that are used in the analysis.
These variables are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.
Health status:
The SOEP provides annual information on individuals' health status by both a measure of legally attested disability status and of self-assessed health 2 The model is estimated for the waves after the 2005 reform of the German income tax system.
On January 1, 2005, a reform of the German tax system came into effect lowering the marginal tax rates and making some changes to the tax base. The focus on waves with a relatively homogeneous institutional framework facilitates the computation of the value functions (see below). The survey year 2004 is only included to provide information for the lagged variables of the model. 3 The eligibility criteria of the early retirement scheme are independent of the legal disability status. 4 Some outliers with wages below e 7.5 or above e 35 per hour are excluded from the sample.
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Work experience is defined as years of full-time experience. 
Statutory pension insurance scheme
The statutory retirement age of the individuals is 65 years. 12 After retirement, individuals receive public pension benefits. The benefits are a deterministic function of 8 The income tax rate increases with an individual's taxable income and is payable on all gross income in excess of the income tax allowance. I simplify the analysis by assuming that all individuals receive a net capital income that amounts to 2% of their net wealth.
9 Social security contributions are paid at a constant rate on gross income above a lower limit and below an earnings cap, where half of the contributions are paid by the employer. The contributions of the employees amount to 21.5% of the gross wage.
10 In 2005, the basic monthly amount is e 345 in West and e 331 in East Germany. Individuals are assumed to receive e 300 for rent and e 50 for energy consumption.
11 I assume that all the individuals are entitled for one year of unemployment insurance benefits after becoming unemployed. Similarly to Adda, Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2013) , this simplification avoids an increase in the state space.
12 Between 2012 and 2029, the statutory pension age will be gradually increased from 65 to 67 years for the cohorts born after 1954. The analysis abstracts from this reform.
the accumulated weighted pension points that reflect an individual's employment and wage history.
13 This leads to complicated dynamic incentives that can be captured by a DPDC framework. An individual accumulates one pension point for each year of employment, which is given a weight of wagent waget
, where wage nt is individual n's wage in year t and wage t is the average wage in year t.
14 Individuals obtain additional pension points for child care, military service, and during periods of unemployment.
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The possibility of early retirement constitutes an insurance against work incapacity. early retirement is likely to be endogenous and to be a strategic variable of both the employer and employee. Individuals who are in sufficiently poor health status (work incapacity) can opt for early retirement even before age 60. In this case, they receive pension benefits as if they had worked until age 60. However, this requires a medical examination that is performed by a physician from the statutory pension insurance scheme. While it is hard to believe that individuals who actually are in good health status can easily pass the examination, it appears to be likely that individuals who are in bad health status, but are not work incapacitated, can pass by exaggerating their health problems. For each year of early retirement before the age of 65, 63 for individuals in bad health status, a penalty of 3.6% is applied on the pension benefits.
The penalty is applied up to a maximum of 18% of the pension benefits, where this ceiling is reduced to 10.08% for individuals in bad health status. Hence, bad health status opens up the option of early retirement before age 60 and goes along with lower reductions on an early retiree's pension benefits.
13 In 2005, the value of one pension point amounted to monthly benefits of e 26.13 in West and e 22.97 in East Germany. Since 2005, pensioners must pay income tax on 50% of their pension benefits. Until 2040, this share will gradually increase up to 100%.
14 There is a year-specific cap on pension point weights, which has been approximately 2 during the observation period.
15 Individuals who receive unemployment insurance benefits also pay social security contributions and receive 0.8 pension points that are weighted according to the last wage. Pension points for individuals who receive social assistance benefits are negligible. I assume that individuals have received unemployment benefits during up to two years of their periods of non-employment when computing the number of pension points.
16 Between 2006 and 2010, the minimum age for unemployed individuals increased from 60 to 63.
4 Model and specification
In the following subsections, I present a detailed outline of the structural life cycle model. After summing up its main features, I proceed with a description of the various components of the model.
Main features
Methodology: The methodological framework is similar to Rust and Phelan (1997) , but -like other recent studies (e.g. van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), French and Jones (2011) This accounts for selection into the labor market.
Health: Health is modeled as a binary autoregressive process that depends on lagged health status, years of education, and age. Since it is unobserved whether a health shock leads to a work incapacity, the model assumes that bad health status affects employment and early retirement through the labor market risks (captured by job offer and separation rates), the eligibility requirements for early retirement, and the financial incentives of the early retirement scheme. Low job offer rates induce persistence of unemployment that is taken into account by forward-looking individuals.
For this reason, unemployed individuals who are in bad health status may have a strong incentive to opt for early retirement (low opportunity costs). Medical expenditures are not included in the model because they are covered by health insurance and do not affect the individuals' financial situation.
Budget: Wages are estimated within the model (as a function of years of education, work experience, and region of residence) and pension benefits are a deterministic function of retirement age, work experience, and past wages. This induces complicated dynamic incentives that are captured by the DPDC framework. When deciding about employment and early retirement, individuals take into account both the effect of human capital accumulation on wages (Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) ) and the effect on future pension claims. Net income is computed by applying the rules and regulations of the German tax and transfer system and statutory pension insurance scheme, where unemployment insurance and early retirement constitute a partial insurance against work incapacity. After retirement, individuals make no more choices and dissave according to the value of an actuarially fair life annuity that could be bought with the accumulated wealth.
The model includes the following state variables: individual's age, net wealth, work experience, years of education, residence in East or West Germany, health status, and previous period's choices. The choice problem consists of two parts: i) an optimal stopping problem regarding early retirement and ii) employment and saving choices.
Objective function
I specify a DPDC model of individuals' employment, early retirement and saving choices. Individuals are finitely lived and die no later than period T, which is set to be 100. Discrete time is indexed by t (individual's age), and there is a number of N 
where β is the time discount factor, which is set to be 0.96 (Gourinchas and Parker (2002) provide a reliable estimate) and p t+j is the conditional survival probability of the individual for period t+j given survival until period t. Information on conditional survival probabilities originates from life tables of the Human Mortality Database. 
Utility function
Individuals have preferences about consumption and leisure time that are represented by the following time separable random utility model: with either non-employment or retirement. α 1 is a consumption weight and ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA). Unobserved heterogeneity in the leisure preferences is reflected by α 2n . This utility function assumes additive separability between consumption and leisure time as well as its unobserved random component.
I also estimated a specification that allows for non-separability between consumption and leisure time. The estimates of the unchanged parameters and the results of the simulations are insensitive to this choice of specification. The vector
contains the parameters of the utility function.
that is required for social assistance benefits. The exemption level of e 10,000 is assumed because the actual rules are very complicated and enforcement of these rules is unobserved.
18 University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 5.12.2012). I average the age-specific conditional survival probabilities over the years 2005 through 2010, which are the survey years that are used for the estimation of the model. Using different mortality rates by survey year would require the computation of different value functions for each survey year and, thus, increase the computational burden substantially.
Value function
Individuals' beliefs about future states are captured by a Markov transition function q(s nt+1 |s nt , d nt ) indicating the respective transition probabilities. In particular, q(s nt+1 |s nt , d nt ) captures expectations of the transitions of the health status that evolve stochastically over time. Furthermore, it takes into account the expectations of unemployed individuals to receive a job offer and of employed individuals to face a job separation in the following period (see below). For state variables like net wealth or work experience that evolve deterministically for given choices, the probability of the determined state is one while it is zero for all other possible states of the variable.
Since there is a discrete set of possible future states, q(s nt+1 |s nt , d nt ) is a probability mass function and not a density function. By Bellman's principle of optimality, the value function V t (s nt ) can be represented recursively as
where D(s nt ) is the choice set that is available to individual n in period t and g(·) is the probability density function of the unobserved random components of the utility function. Individuals only make choices until retirement and the available choice set depends on the individual's state, s nt . The choice set is restricted by the eligibility requirements for early retirement and by job offer and separation rates that are estimated within the model. 
Job offer and separation rates
Health process
Good health is modeled as a binary autoregressive process that depends on lagged health status, education, and age. This takes into account the high observed persistence of the health status. Education captures differences in the health risks by socio-economic status.
19 The probability of good health is given by
where Λ(·) is the logistic distribution function, health nt is a binary variable that indicates good health status, educ nt is years of education, and age50 nt indicates an age of 50 years or older. The inclusion of age50 nt -instead of a linear age measure -as an explanatory variable is in line with the observed health pattern in the data. Unobserved time-constant heterogeneity is captured by τ n and is allowed to be correlated with the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity in both the utility function and the wage equation. The health process does not include health investments because heterogeneity in health behavior is captured to some extent by education and medical expenditures are covered by health insurance. Since it is unobserved whether a health shock leads to a work incapacity, the model assumes that bad health status affects employment and early retirement through the labor market risks (captured by job offer and separation rates), the eligibility requirements for early retirement, and the financial incentives of the early retirement scheme. The vector θ h = (ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 , τ n ) contains the parameters of the health process.
19 Quasi-experimental evidence suggests that education even exerts a causal effect on health and health behavior (see e.g. Kemptner, Juerges, and Reinhold (2011) for Germany).
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Gross wage
Gross wages are assumed to follow a log-normal distribution. The logarithm of gross wages is modeled as
where educ n is years of education, ex nt is years of work experience, east nt is a dummy variable for residence in East Germany, κ n is time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, and μ nt is i.i.d. N (0, σ μ ). 20 It follows from the DPDC framework that individuals take into account the human capital accumulation process when making their employment choice (Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) 
Budget constraint
Individuals face a budget constraint when making their saving/consumption choice.
The constraint comprises three equations:
wealth nt+1 = (1 + r t ) (wealth nt + savings(d nt ))
20 Some studies apply a two-step estimation approach and assume that µ nt follows an autoregressive process (e.g. French (2005) , French and Jones (2011) ). However, these studies do not account for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with the leisure preferences.
21 Individuals are assumed to receive the expected wage if they are employed. From a theoretical point of view, this is justified if the transitory component of observed wages is only observed after the employment choice has been made and if individuals base their choices on expected wages. This abstraction from transitory wage risks simplifies the estimation of the model substantially and is of little importance for the simulation of the life cycle outcomes because transitory wage shocks even out over the life cycle. When computing gross labor earnings, I assume that individuals work the median number of hours, which is 40 in the sample.
22 When estimating a specification with log(wage nt ) as a function of health status, the respective coefficient estimate is small and insignificant. It appears that individuals who are in bad health status either do not work or receive a wage according to their qualification. Of course, the qualification in terms of work experience may depend on past health outcomes. This is taken into account by the model. 
Unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions
Following the approach of Heckman and Singer (1984) , unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for semi-nonparametrically by allowing for a finite number of unobserved types m ∈ 1, ..., M (random effects). Each type comprises a fixed proportion of the individuals in the population. Hence, the individual-specific parameters α 2n , τ n , and κ n are assumed to be equal to the respective type-specific parameters α 2m , τ m , and κ m .
The probability that individual n is of type m is given by
where γ M is normalized to zero and (the process starts before the age of 40) are exogenous conditional on type. This follows the idea of Wooldridge (2005) .
24 As opposed to an approach that assumes that the structural model can explain the distribution of the initial values of the state variables, this is computationally much less intense and does not rely on potentially unrealistic out-of-sample extrapolations (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010)).
Choice probabilities and log-likelihood
Given the finite horizon of the individual's optimization problem, it can be solved recursively. The expected value function, v t (s nt , d nt ), for period T is simply given by this period's expected utility flow:
By Bellman's principle of optimality, the individual's optimization problem can be written as a two-period problem for the other periods of time. It follows from the type 1 extreme value distribution of nt (d nt ) that the expected value function has a closed form solution (Rust (1987) ):
The computation of the expected value functions for periods t=65,...,T is comparatively simple because individual choices are only modeled for t=40,...,64. Rust (1987) shows that under the assumptions of additive separability and conditional independence, the conditional choice probabilities have a closed form solution (here: mixed logit probabilities):
When computing choice probabilities, I take into account that the choice of employment is restricted with a probability of 1-φ The expected value functions are only computed for a discretized state space in order to save computational time (Keane and Wolpin (1994) ). As a consequence, interpolation methods must be used to approximate the functions at the observed values of the state variables. I resort to a cubic spline function -as recommended e.g.
by Adda and Cooper (2003) for the estimation of dynamic models -to interpolate the expected value functions for net wealth, work experience, and years of education. For each of these variables, I define five grid points. My estimation results are insensitive to an increase in the number of these grid points. In total, the value function is computed for 1000 × M grid points for each of the choices. Aside the points for net wealth, work experience, and years of education, the grid comprises points for the binary state variables region of residence, health status, lagged employment status and the unobserved types.
The log-likelihood function of the sample is given by
where 
FIML and extended EM algorithm
In principle, the model can be estimated by finding the maximum of the log-likelihood function. However, due to the non-separability of the log-likelihood function a stepwise maximization is impossible. Unless the starting values used for the optimization algorithm are very good, a direct maximization with respect to all parameters may involve considerable numerical problems and is computationally intense. For this reason, I resort to an extension of the EM algorithm to obtain good starting values for a subsequent FIML estimation. The extended EM algorithm has been proposed by Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) for the estimation of finite mixture models with timeconstant unobserved heterogeneity. They show how this algorithm can facilitate the estimation with little loss in efficiency by allowing for a sequential estimation of the parameters.
By Bayes rule, the conditional probability Π mn that individual n is of type m, given the observed choices and the parameters that are contained in θ U , φ, θ h , θ w , and γ (posterior type probability), is given by
Using the conditional type probabilities, the following additively separable expected log-likelihood function can be derived:
The EM algorithm reintroduces additive separability at the maximization step.
Starting with arbitrary initial values, the maximum of the log-likelihood function can be found by maximizing iteratively the expected log-likelihood function, then using the estimates of θ U , φ, θ h , and θ w to estimate γ by maximizing the log-likelihood function conditionally on these parameter estimates, and finally using all the estimated parameters for updating the posterior type probabilities. Subsequently, the expected log-likelihood function is maximized again. Iterating on these steps until convergence yields the maximum of the log-likelihood function (see Boyles (1983) and Wu (1983) for formal proofs). The additive separability of the expected log-likelihood function allows a sequential maximization. This is done by first estimating θ h and θ w , and then taking these estimates as given in a maximization of the expected log-likelihood function with respect to θ U . Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) show that such an extension of the EM algorithm produces consistent parameter estimates. While this estimation approach reduces the computational burden, the parameter estimates are inefficient and the estimation of standard errors is complicated because the computational time makes the use of bootstrapping methods unpractical. Therefore, I apply the extended EM algorithm to obtain good starting values for a subsequent FIML estimation. This also facilitates the computation of standard errors that can be derived from the inverse of the Hessian of the log-likelihood function at its maximum.
6 Estimation results and model fit
Parameter estimates
The extended EM algorithm gets close to convergence after a number of iterations that depends on the choice of starting values. 25 I abort the algorithm after 10 iterations and use the current trail values of the parameters as initial values in a FIML estimation.
While the extended EM algorithm slows down when approaching convergence, the optimization algorithm that is used for the FIML estimation converges comparatively quickly when using good starting values. The log-likelihood at its maximum and at the trail values from the EM algorithm after 10 iterations differ only slightly (see table 2 ).
Using bad starting values for the FIML approach usually results in non-convergence of the optimization algorithm. The model is estimated allowing for two unobserved types (M=2). 26 I did not achieve convergence for more than two unobserved types. Table 2 shows the parameter estimates, the current trail values of the extended EM algorithm after 10 iterations, and the starting values used for the extended EM algorithm. In the following, I shortly discuss the estimation results:
Utility function: The estimate of the consumption weight α 1 is reasonable and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ, is estimated to be 1.17. This estimate of ρ is larger than the estimate of Rust and Phelan (1997) , but smaller than the estimates of French (2005) and French and Jones (2011) . Individuals exhibit unobserved heterogeneity in their leisure preferences that is captured by the type-specific parameter, α 2m . The parameter estimates for the value of leisure time are positive, but significant only for individuals of type 2.
Job offer and separation rates: The low estimated job offer rates indicate a high persistence of unemployment. This matches the small number of observed transitions from unemployment to employment in the data. Both the job offer and separation rates differ substantially by health status. A health shock is estimated to increase the labor market risks both by lowering the probability of a job offer and by raising the probability of a job separation. Note: The indicated starting values are used for the extended EM algorithm, which is aborted after 10 iterations. Then, the current trial values of the parameters are used as starting values for the FIML estimation. At last, the standard errors are derived from the inverse of the Hessian of the log-likelihood function at its maximum. The sample consists of 594 independent and, in total, of 2,016 observations.
Wage equation:
There is substantial unobserved heterogeneity in the earnings capacity of individuals that is captured by the type-specific constant κ m and that is negatively correlated with the leisure preferences. As expected, years of education and work experience increase wages while residence in East Germany is associated with a lower wage. The latter finding reflects persistent differences in the level of wages between East and West Germany. The standard deviation of the normally distributed μ is estimated to be 0.21.
Health process:
The coefficient on lagged health status, ψ 1 , points to considerable state dependence. Hence, individuals who experience a health shock tend to remain in bad health status. Years of education are associated positively with an individual's probability of good health. In line with the observed health pattern, an age of 50 years or older decreases the probability of good health.
Type probabilities:
The two unobserved types are predicted to comprise 38.4%
and 61.6% of the population. Only the estimates for the constant and the coefficient on the initial observed employment status are significant, while the coefficient estimates on the other initial observed conditions are reasonable, but insignificant. The estimates suggest that individuals of type 1 are more likely than individuals of type 2 to enter the sample in employment.
Model fit
I check the model fit by making predictions for the probabilities of early retirement, employment, health status, and saving behavior for the individuals in my sample. I compare average predictions of the model by age with non-parametrically smoothed means.
When computing average predictions for the retirement and employment choices, I take into account that retirement is modeled as an absorbing state and adjust the predictions such that they refer to the full population of retirees and non-retirees. 27 The smoothed means are computed on the basis of non-parametric local constant estimations of the association between the respective outcomes and age using the full sample of retirees and non-retirees. The local constant estimators thereby rely on a plugin es-27 I compute the probability of employment as the probability of not having opted for early retirement in previous periods and choosing employment in the current period. The probability of being retired is the probability of either having opted for early retirement in one of the previous periods or opting for early retirement in the current period. timator of the asymptotically optimal constant bandwidth (see Fan and Gijbels (1996) , StataCorp (2009)) and an Epanechnikov kernel. Figure 1 presents the model's predictions and the smoothed means. It turns out that the average predictions fit the data reasonably well. However, I underpredict savings, which is a common problem of structural models (see e.g. van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) , table 4). This is driven by the predicted choice probabilities for the higher saving categories and becomes relevant only for individuals with comparatively high income. As a consequence, an investigation of poverty risks should not be compromised.
Since saving behavior merely affects how individuals distribute their consumption over the life cycle, the analysis of risks for lifetime consumption is unproblematic. Better predictions of the saving behavior presumably require the estimation of heterogeneous risk preferences. But, I did not achieve convergence of the optimization algorithm when allowing for additional type-specific coefficients for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ, and the consumption weight, α 1 .
Policy Analysis
This section investigates the health-related risks of consumption and old age poverty.
While the first subsection focuses on the health-related risks within the current institutional framework, the second subsection presents simulations that investigate meanstested minimum pension benefits as an insurance against old age poverty.
Health-related risks
Life cycle simulations are implemented for individuals by differing endowments at age 40, where endowments differ with respect to net wealth, work experience, and years of education. Individuals are assumed to be in good health status and to be employed in the year before they turn 40. The simulations are implemented under the assumption that individuals do not have additional private disability insurance. I simulate five scenarios where health shocks do or do not occur at different points in the life cycle.
A comparison of simulated consumption paths between the scenarios sheds light on the health-related risks of consumption and old age poverty that are uninsured by the German social security system. In the first scenario, no health shock occurs (reference scenario). The second scenario follows the specification of the life cycle model such that health evolves stochastically according to the estimated health process. In the other three scenarios, a persistent health shock is assumed to occur at ages 60, 55, and 45, respectively, while no health shock occurs before these ages. A similar approach has been adopted by Haan and Myck (2009) I consider types of individuals in East and West Germany who are endowed at age 40 with a net wealth of either zero or e 20,000, with either an employment history without any gaps or with a 5-year-period of non-employment, and having completed either 9, 13 or 18 years of education. 28 The investigation of such a grid of endowments gives an idea of the magnitude of risks and shows how these risks interrelate with the endowments.
Lifetime consumption
Expected consumption paths are computed by taking averages of the simulated consumption paths. Table 3 Expected losses can be severe if a health shock occurs at an early stage of the life cycle. For example, an individual in West Germany with a medium level of education (13 years), no gap in the employment history, and no net wealth at age 40 who 28 While 9 years correspond to the compulsory schooling, 13 years can be interpreted as either the completion of 10 years of schooling plus 3 more years of vocational training or the completion of an academic track school without any further professional training. 18 years usually correspond to 13 years of schooling in an academic track school plus 5 years of university education.
29 The NPVs of expected lifetime consumption at age 40 are presented in table 6 in the Appendix. experiences a persistent health shock at age 45 faces a loss in the NPV of expected lifetime consumption of 18.1%. A persistent health shock at age 60 seems to induce comparatively small losses. In some cases such a health shock may even be financially beneficial because individuals who would have opted for early retirement anyway face a lower penalty on their pension benefits when being in bad health status. The simulations suggest that the German social security system may not sufficiently insure individuals against their health-related consumption risks. Of course, individuals can buy additional private disability insurance. These simulations merely show the limitations of the public insurance schemes. Note: The simulated risk of old age poverty at age 40 is presented for scenarios 1-5. The differences between scenarios 2-5 and scenario 1 (no health shock) indicate health-related changes in the risk of old-age poverty. The risks are simulated by endowments at age 40.
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Old age poverty
This subsection focuses on distributional outcomes and examines the health-related risk of old age poverty. I take the EU definition of relative poverty as a reference that defines individuals as being at the "risk of poverty" when receiving a net income below 60% of the median net equivalent income. This indicates a threshold value of e 816 of monthly net income in 2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt (2008) sume out of their accumulated wealth). Of course, the choice of the threshold value for poverty is a bit arbitrary. However, the overall pattern of the simulated risks of old age poverty and the health-related changes in these risks are insensitive to variations of the threshold value. Table 4 presents the simulated risk of old age poverty by endowments at age 40.
The differences between scenarios 2-5 and scenario 1 (no health shock) indicate healthrelated changes in the risk of old age poverty. For example, an individual with a medium level of education (13 years), no gap in the employment history, and no net wealth at age 40 who resides in West Germany faces a risk of old age poverty of 5.4% in the absence of health shocks, while the risk rises to 12.0% under stochastic health, and amounts to 24.7% when the inividual experiences a persistent health shock at age 45. In East Germany, an individual with the same endowments faces risks of 52.8%, 58.3%, and 67.0% in the respective scenarios. The magnitude of the risks and healthrelated changes in these risks depend substantially on an individual's endowments at age 40 and may be sizable. The risk is greater in East than in West Germany and for individuals who lack net wealth or have experienced periods of non-employment. The findings suggest that there is a substantial risk of health-related old age poverty that is uninsured by the German social security system.
Means-tested minimum pension benefits
Given the discussed issue of health-related old age poverty, policy makers might consider a policy intervention. This subsection investigates a counterfactual reform of the statutory pension insurance scheme that insures individuals against the risk of old age poverty by introducing a minimum level of pension benefits at the -above definedpoverty line. Hence, the risk of old age poverty is reduced to zero (by definition). However, such a reform raises a concern about an increase in abuse of the early retirement option and a decline in average pension age that is due to an increased attractivity of early retirement -in particular -for individuals with otherwise very low pension claims (moral hazard problem). In the model, cheating is taken into account in the sense that individuals who are in bad health status may opt for early retirement even though some of these individuals are not work incapacitated such that their employment choice is not restricted. There is also a countervailing effect because minimum pension benefits reduce the risk of future pension claims by making them less dependent on labor market outcomes (lower bound). This induces an increase in the option value of remaining in the labor force.
I resort to an idea of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) who argue that disability benefits should be means-tested in order to make it more unattractive to falsely claim benefits. The rationale behind this idea is that individuals need savings to smooth their consumption, but the more they save the more they are penalized by the means test. This may prevent false claims of disability benefits if these benefits are not too generous relative to the wages that individuals can earn on the labor market. In the context of a pension scheme where the option of early retirement constitutes an insurance against work incapacity, this idea can be applied when introducing minimum pension benefits. A means test may reduce the potential increase in abuse that is due to the introduction of minimum pension benefits and ensure that only individuals who are in need benefit from the reform.
The scheme is set up as follows. If net pension benefits are below the minimum level (e 816 of monthly consumption after retirement), net benefits are raised to the minimum level, but the increase is means-tested (as it is also the case for social assistance benefits).
31 I use the model to simulate changes in expected retirement age by differing endowments at age 40. This is done analogously to the simulations in the previous subsection and under the assumption that the reform can be implemented without any increase in taxes or social security contributions (no budget neutrality).
Given the level of means-tested social assistance benefits that can be claimed anyway (see section 3), any rise in taxes or social security contributions that is necessary to finance the reform is small and, hence, behavioral responses to this rise would be small as well. The approach avoids the problem of arbitrarily choosing a financing scheme, where behavioral responses may depend on this choice. In the model, an individual's consumption is raised to the minimum level if the sum of pension benefits and dissavings (according to the value of an actuarially fair life annuity that could be bought with the accumulated wealth) is below the minimum level. Note: The changes in expected retirement age and net present values of expected lifetime consumption at age 40 that are induced through the introduction of minimum pension benefits are simulated under stochastic health (scenario 2) both with and without a means test. The simulations are performed by endowments at age 40.
age (between 0 and 0.4 years depending on endowments) if the minimum pension benefits are means-tested. The lower the net wealth at age 40 and the lower the level of education the larger the decrease. Even for individuals with a low level of education and no net wealth at age 40 the means test is highly relevant for expected retirement age. Without the means test, the decrease is substantial (between 0 and 3.7 years depending on endowments) suggesting a severe moral hazard problem. For some types of individuals at the upper end of the income distribution in West Germany, the reform is even predicted to induce a slight increase in expected retirement age that is due to the above described countervailing effect. Overall, the simulations indicate that a means test mitigates the moral hazard problem substantially.
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Conclusion
This paper proposes a dynamic life cycle model of health risks, employment, early retirement, and wealth accumulation in order to analyze the health-related risks of consumption and old age poverty. In particular, the model includes a health process, the interaction between health and employment risks, and an explicit modeling of the German public insurance schemes, where unemployment insurance and early retirement constitute a partial insurance against work incapacity. Moreover, a policy simulation relates to an idea of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) I also use the life cycle simulations to examine the health-related risk of old age poverty. The magnitude of the risk and health-related changes in this risk depend substantially on an individual's endowments at age 40 and may be sizable. The results of this analysis motivate the simulation of minimum pension benefits that insure individuals against the risk of old age poverty. While such a reform raises a concern about an increase in abuse of the early retirement option, the simulations indicate that a means test mitigates the moral hazard problem substantially. For a non-means-tested scheme, the simulations suggest a severe moral hazard problem. This finding may also apply to other countries with similar institutions.
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